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RESIDENCE AS QTIP
— by Neil E. Harl*
 The concept of qualified terminable interest property or
QTIP,1 which has been available since 1982, has enjoyed
much greater use than originally anticipated by many
planners.2  While most farm and ranch property poses few
problems in funding, a marital deduction with a QTIP
election funded with the residence or residence part of the
form requires special care.3
Basic QTIP requirements
An election may be made by the personal representative
of the estate to treat life estates passing to a surviving
spouse as eligible for the marital deduction. 4  To be
eligible, the spouse must receive a qualifying income
interest for life which requires that both of the following
conditions be met —
•  The spouse must be entitled to all of the income from
the entire interest, or all of the income from  a specific part
of the interest, payable annually or more frequently, for a
period measured solely by the spouse's life.5
•  There must not be a power in any person to appoint
any part of the property subject to the qualifying income
interest to any person other than the spouse during the
spouse's life.6
The first of the two basic requirements has posed the
major obstacle for residences and the residence part of
farms.  The critical question is what interest in a residence
is the equivalent of receiving all of the income from the
property.
Electing QTIP for residence
A devise of the personal residence or residence part of a
farm or ranch may pose problems of eligibility.
•  A residence may not be eligible for QTIP treatment if
the spouse's right of occupancy of the residence would
terminate upon abandonment of the residence.7
•  If the surviving spouse's right to the residence is
dependent upon continuing occupancy, the property may
not be eligible as QTIP.8  Similarly, an interest of a
surviving spouse in a residence may not be eligible for a
QTIP election if the surviving spouse would lose the
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interest by moving to a new residence.9  Even a provision
that would result in loss of the interest in a residence for
failure to occupy the residence for some stated time period
may cost the estate the QTIP election.10
•  In the event the residence is to be sold if the surviving
spouse vacates the residence and the proceeds are to pass to
someone else, the property is not eligible QTIP.1 1
However, to the extent the proceeds of sale are to be held
for the spouse for life the property may be eligible for the
election.12
•  Indeed, any conveyance less than the equivalent of a
life estate under state law is not eligible for QTIP.12
However, a bequest of "full and exclusive" use of a lake
home provided "substantially that degree" of beneficial
enjoyment of a life estate, was not subordinated to the
rights of anyone else and was deemed eligible as QTIP.13
•  Similarly, a surviving spouse's right to occupy a
residence "for as long as he desires" entitled the estate to
QTIP treatment.14
In conclusion
Special care is needed in planning for a QTIP election
where a residence or residence part of a farm is involved.
Attention should be given to any language appended to the
devise of the residence to the surviving spouse.  Any
significant diminution of the spouse's interest from a
traditional life estate could cost the estate QTIP treatment
as to the residence.
FOOTNOTES
1 See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7).
2 See generally 5 Harl, Agricultural Law  § 44.04[6][b] (1993);
Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 5.04[3][b][ii] (1993).
3 See, e.g., Est. of Peacock v. U.S., 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
60,051 (11th Cir. 1990).
4 I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7).  Est. of Higgins v. Comm’r, 91 T.C. 61
(1988), aff'd, 897 F.2d 856 (6th Cir. 1990) (QTIP election not
allowed where no election made on estate return nor did return
identify QTIP property); Spohn Estate v. U.S., 90-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,027 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (no clear and
unequivocal communication of intent to elect QTIP treatment).
5 See, e.g., Ellingson v. Comm’r, 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
60,101 (9th Cir. 1992) (QTIP treatment allowed for family
farm property even though trader could accumulate income;
however, despite accumulation provision, trader actually
    Agricultural Law Digest                                                                                                                                                                                           150
*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM). For information about ordering the Manual, see the last page of this issue.
possessed no power to accumulate income because of pressure
of adverse death tax consequences if QTIP not available).
6 I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii).  See Est. of Boydstun v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1984-312, aff'd without pub. op., 774 F.2d 1173
(9th Cir. 1985) (spouse's life estate interest in trust not eligible
for marital deduction as qualified terminable interest property
because spouse did not have power over corpus).
7 Est. of Kyle v. Comm’r, 94 T.C. 829 (1990).
8 Ltr. Rul. 9229004, March 31, 1992 (surviving spouse to
receive decedent's home "subject...to the condition of his
occupancy...." not a qualifying income interest for life because
surviving spouse could neither convey residence nor obtain
rent from it); Ltr. Rul. 8651002, Aug. 12, 1986 (devise of right
of occupancy in decedent's residence to surviving spouse not
eligible QTIP because interest based on occupancy and not life
of surviving spouse).
9 Ltr. Rul. 8736004, May 22, 1987.
10
  Ltr. Rul. 8742001, June 30, 1987 (failure to live in residence
for at least one month in any calendar year).
11 Ltr. Rul. 8843004, July 27, 1988 (proceeds of sale to be
distributed to decedent's child).
12 Ltr. Rul. 9040001, July 8, 1990 (50 percent of proceeds held in
trust for spouse for life produced QTIP as to 50 percent).
13 Ltr. Rul. 9033004, no date given.
14 Ltr. Rul. 9126020, March 20, 1991.
15 Est. of Peacock v. U.S., 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,051
(11th Cir. 1990).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
FENCE. An owner of a large tract of farm land sold the
northern half to the defendants and the southern half to the
parents of the plaintiffs. The tracts were separated by a
fence which meandered back and forth over the true
boundary. Both parties testified that they did not consider
the fence as the true boundary. The plaintiffs used the
disputed property as pasture land, first as tenants of their
parents and as full owners. The defendants used the disputed
property as a trash dump and as a drain point for a sewer
line. The court held that the plaintiffs’ title to the disputed
property could not be acquired by adverse possession
through mutual recognition of the fence as the boundary
because neither party ever considered the fence as the true
boundary.  In addition, the plaintiffs did not have exclusive
possession of the disputed property because both parties
made continuous use of the property. Thornburg v.
Haeker, 502 N.W.2d 434 (Neb. 1993).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   
DISCHARGE-ALM § 13.03[6].* The debtor entered
into a series of contracts for the sale and purchase of a horse
and its foals in order to create a tax shelter for the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs paid $15,000 to the debtor as “interest” on a
promissory note given for the horse and claimed the
payment as a deduction on the 1982 federal tax return. The
deduction was disallowed by the IRS which considered the
transactions as shams. The plaintiffs sought to have their
claims against the debtor declared nondischargeable for
misrepresentation and fraud. The court held that the claims
were dischargeable because the plaintiffs did not rely on the
representations of the debtor as to the tax deductibility of
the interest payments since the plaintiffs knew that the
transactions would not produce bona fide tax deductions. In
re Farley, 156 B.R. 486 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993).
EXEMPTIONS-ALM § 13.03[3]*
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtors claimed a homestead
exemption for the equity remaining after a mortgage. The
debtors sought to avoid a pre-petition judgment lien against
the homestead as impairing their exemption. The court held
that because the judgment lien exceeded the debtors’
exemption amount, the lien was completely avoided. In re
Osborne, 156 B.R. 188 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1993).
The debtor claimed a homestead exemption. The
homestead was subject to four liens in the following priority
order: (1) a judgment lien, (2) a creditor’s judgment lien, (3)
an unavoidable federal tax lien, and (4) a county tax lien. the
debtor sought avoidance of the second lien as impairing the
homestead exemption. The creditor argued that because the
amount of the first two liens did not exceed the fair market
value of the house less the exemption amount, the liens did
not impair the exemption but that the later liens were the
ones which impaired the exemption. The court held that the
priority of the liens did not affect the impairment issue and
allowed avoidance of the second lien. In re Bradshaw, 156
B.R. 239 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1993).
The debtor claimed a homestead exemption and sought
to avoid a judgment lien against the house. The Bankruptcy
Court had avoided the entire $92,000 lien, although the
exemption amount was only $12,000.  The creditor argued
that the house was already exempt from the lien under Utah
law; therefore, no impairment existed. The appellate court
reversed, holding that the homestead exemption was not
impaired because the lien could not affect the homestead
exemption under state law.  In addition, the court held that
the entire lien could not be avoided but that the lien could
have been avoided only to the extent of the impaired
exemption amount. In re Sanders, 156 B.R. 667 (D. Utah
1993).
HOMESTEAD. The debtor filed a declaration of
homestead post-petition and sought avoidance of judgment
liens impairing the exemption. The debtor vacated the
property the day after filing the homestead declaration and
applied for court approval of the sale of the property. The
court held that the post-petition declaration of homestead
and sale of the property did not affect the debtor’s right to
the exemption; however, the court ordered a hearing as to
whether the declaration of homestead was truthful in that the
debtor’s actions were contrary to the declaration that the
debtor intended to use the property as a residence. In re
Zohner, 156 B.R. 288 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1993).
More than three years before filing for Chapter 7, the
debtor disposed of several non-exempt assets and used the
